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The Syrian Revolution and the struggle for Kurdish Liberation
FSA and YPG units announce the formation of the Burkan Al-Firat coalition to combat ISIS and defend Kobanê.
The Kurdish people have entered a new phase in the struggle to control their future. The current context is born of the Syrian revolution that emerged as part of the “Arab Spring” of early 2011. The outcome of the Kurdish struggle in Syria (and neighboring countries) is intimately tied to unfolding of the revolutionary civil war in Syria. Their heroic resistance in the northern Syrian town of Kobanê (‘Ayn al-Arab) against the fighters of the right-wing ISIS organization is just one part of it.
Importantly though the need to resist ISIS in the region of Rojava in northern Syria has brought together political groups which previously were facing-off against each other. The success of an allied force combining Kurdish YPG and forces aligned to the predominantly Arab Free Syrian Army (FSA) in defending Kobanê sets a powerful precedent for the rest of Syria.
The Syrian revolution has endured for over 3 years now in the face of monstrous regime repression and international apathy. Upwards of 200,000 have died – mostly civilian victims of the regime’s brutal war on the population. Syrian refugees number over 3 million[1] with a further 6.5 million internally displaced.[2]
Alongside the military campaign, the Syrian regime of Bashar Al-Assad has waged an ideological campaign against the revolution, seeking to paint it as the work of US-backed mercenaries seeking to impose a repressive Sunni-Islamist theocracy. It attempted to stir up sectarian divisions within the revolution to mirror the Alawi/Shi‘ah sectarianism of the regime. Until quite recently its success at this had been minimal.[3]
Then, as the regime’s counter-revolutionary war dragged on, and the brutal massacres by loyalist Alawi paramilitaries and Shi‘ah fighters imported from Lebanon, Iraq and Iran[4] mounted, Assad got the enemy he wanted. ISIS’ sectarianism emerged as a response to regime sectarianism – that of both the Syrian regime and of the sectarian Shi‘ah regime installed by the US-led occupation of Iraq. Fearing a revival of the revolutionary wave which emerged in 2011 and also seeing the opportunity extend their influence, regimes of all stripes across the region have tried to influence the war by sponsoring groups who will serve their interests and have a conservatizing effect on the revolutionary wave.
Despite these pressures and the near-absence of assistance from the outside world, the Syrian Revolution lives on. The mass movement which began in 2011 with the aim of ending dictatorship and creating a just, free and democratic Syria continues on as an armed struggle as it once did through peaceful protest.
Kurdish component
Although much commentary refers to “The Kurds” as a homogenous entity, they are affected by a multitude of political divisions. Spread across the national boundaries of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran, each region has its own particular circumstances. For example, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) of northern Iraq is dominated by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Massoud Barzani, who actively backed the US-led invasion of Iraq to gain a semi-autonomous region.
The KRG has established close relations with Turkey and has become its second biggest trading partner after Germany. A planned oil pipeline from Iraqi Kurdistan, through Turkey to the Mediterranean would be the jewel in the crown.[5] This puts the project of a broader Kurdish independence at odds with the interests of KRG and the ruling KDP who seek rapprochement with Turkey.
Within the Kurdish regions of Syria, known as West Kurdistan or Rojava, the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekitiya Democrat or PYD) is dominant.
From July 2012 the Syrian regime, its forces stretched, started to give control of territory and state institutions to the PYD, while maintaining some presence.[6] From that point the facts are the subject of some controversy.
For its part, the PYD poses as having taken a position of neutrality. Spokesperson of the YPG, Redure Khalil, in Nov 2013 interview with AFP put his position:
“Our strategy is to defend out land and our people. As long as the Syrian regime and armed groups don’t attack us, we don’t attack them.”[7]
In any case, in the context of revolutionary civil war, neutrality is not an option. Defeat for the Syrian revolution would mean an end to the possibility of Kurdish liberation in the foreseeable future.
However, the allegations that regime-PYD agreement goes beyond one of mutual non-interference to outright collaboration are backed-up by a large body of evidence. The facts show that the Democratic Union Party (PYD) had struck a power-sharing deal with the Assad regime and repressed other Kurdish parties who wanted to fight Assad.[8] This alliance with the Syrian regime has been utterly detrimental to the revolution.[9]
Human Rights watch interviewed ‘Delal’ in Rojava:
“I think they arrested my father because of his political views. They arrested my father during his meeting with his friends in KDPS (Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria). In the first month they just tortured him without mentioning the charge. In the next month they accused him of a bombing in Afrin.” [10]
A Vice News report filmed during Sept 2013 – over a year after the Syrian regime started to withdraw from Rojava – shows the PYD-controlled Asayish militia moving freely through regime-held checkpoints in the northern city of Qamishlo to engage Free Syrian Army-aligned forces.[11] Together with a multitude of other reports[12], this constitutes a solid case that the PYD had established an agreement with the Syrian regime and was acting essentially as a counter-revolutionary police force.
Kurdwatch, a Kurdish-run website dealing with Syrian Kurdish politics has even reported the recruitment of pro-Assad loyalists into the YPG. [13]
President of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) of northern Iraq Maussoud Barzani’s criticised the PYD: “PYD’s cooperation with the regime is a dangerous game for the future of our people in Rojava. PYD has not only taken control of the region, it has already started to arrest and kill members of other party members,” Barzani said.[14] Barzani’s criticism may be hypocritical, given his party’s collaboration with the Turkish state, but he has a point.
Kurdish groups seeking to support the revolt to topple the Assad regime, such as the Freedom Party, Salahudeen Ayubi Kurdish Brigade, Akrad Front and the Komala Brigade have also been repressed by the PYD.
Hardship and opportunity
The onslaught by ISIS on the city of Kobanê has highlighted the importance of correct revolutionary strategy for Kurdish liberation. With the various sections of Syrian society oppressed by the regime having thus far failed to unite effectively, this weakness has meant that the main enemies of the revolution, Assad and ISIS, have had the opportunity to either hold their ground or expand. The assault on Kobanê is both the outcome of the revolution’s weaknesses and an opportunity for a new course.
This September a series of brigades of the YPG and FSA announced the formation of the Burkan Al-Firat coalition to resist ISIS’ assault on Kobanê.[15] Fighting alongside the YPG are fighters from the Kurdish Al-Akrad Front, Islamic Front and other FSA-related groups. Also joining this coalition en masse are members of the local Arab Sherbian tribe.[16][17]
The more this example is followed across Syria, the better. For the Kurdish forces – specifically the PYD – this means renouncing any collaboration with the regime and a commitment to its overthrow. From the point of view of Arab revolutionary forces this means winning the support of the Kurdish masses by working to end to the ethnic and religious discrimination seen under the Ba‘ath regime and supporting a program of full national and democratic rights, including the right of succession. The unity of Syria should only be maintained through consent and not coercion.
To be able to mobilize as much of the population as possible in a revolutionary struggle, the masses must truly see they are fighting for something worth dying for. Wealth redistribution, women’s rights and full rights for national minorities are all important components. With the Kurdish minority alone making up around 10-20 percent[18][19] of the Syrian population, harnessing this power is crucial to the success of the revolution.
[1] http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php
[3] https://revolution101.wordpress.com/2012/08/20/sectarianism-sidelined-in-syria/
[4] Iran’s Secret Army, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZI_88ChjQtU
[5] http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/10/17/pkk-s-rise-in-iraqikurdistan.html
[6] http://www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid=2593&z=en&cure=245
[7] Rojava: A Newborn Country, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fwdHqGVCKiU
[8] http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2012/7/syriakurd530.htm
[9] http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/06/syrias-kurds-oppose-the-regime-y.html#
[10] Under Kurdish Rule in Syria, Human Rights Watch report, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WD-PtKopZok
[11] Vice News, Rojava: Syria’s Unknown War, http://youtu.be/p2zxlFQxkQ4?t=15m49s
[12] http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21628887-syrias-kurds-are-enjoying-more-autonomy-striking-out-their-own
[13] http://www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?cid=1009&z=en
[14] http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/pyd-has-authority-only-on-regions-given-by-the-al-assad-regime-iraqi-kurdish-leader-barzani-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=57956&NewsCatID=352
[15] YPG FSA Agreement: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qePezhg0DFg
[16] Ronahi TV English, YPG FSA Agree on Joint operations: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1kta7yAPMI
[17] Kurdish Militias’ Last Stand Against ISIS, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_uOKOU7j9f0
[18] http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/syrian-kurd-leader-revolution-wont-succeed-without-minorities/251660/?single_page=true
[19] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html
Sectarianism sidelined in Syria
Activists in Kafranbel display an image depicting the spectre of sectarianism being inflated by Assad and by those they see as false revolutionaries.
Anti-sectarian politics has become hegemonic amongst Syrian revolutionaries despite many commentators suggesting the contrary. Even Alawites, from which the majority of the ruling clique are drawn, seem to have had a significant proportion of their number reject the official sectarianism of the regime (see this statement from the Local Coordinating Committees (LCC) website, said to be from the Alawi community in Homs and coastal cities: http://www.lccsyria.org/6085)
Christians too seem to have shirked sectarian influence and embraced the revolution (http://youtu.be/JrLyV79pgAE).
Perhaps most important though is the way in which the population at large – the majority being Sunni -views the Alawites. This is true because of the regime’s use of sectarianism to attempt to convince the Alawites that the Assad regime is their regime and that their fates are inseperable. Any sectarian acts from one side have a tendency to provoke a sectarian response from the other, and a mutually reinforcing back-and-forth sectarian conflict would have the effect of weakening the revolutionary movement. All evidence is that the revolutionary organizations are aware of this dynamic and are taking active measures to reinforce the dominant anti-sectarian attitude which has been present since the outset of the revolution.
On 8 Aug the Local Coordinating Committees published a military Code of Conduct which included a clear provisions against sectarian behaviour (reproduced on this blog here: https://revolution101.wordpress.com/2012/08/20/syrian-revolution-lcc-military-code-of-conduct/)
Since then, anti-sectarian statements seem to have become more numerous. Here is a video announcing a long list of militias which will coordinate and act: “without discrimination among the civilians, regardless of their ethnicities, sects, and their religious and political beliefs.” : People’s Resistance Unit formed (Published on Aug 18, 2012 by ANAChannelEng). Another example is this communique made on 14 Aug in Lattakia announcing a united revolutionary brigade for the Syrian coast, pledging to act without discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or religion: http://youtu.be/LV-jJUDFeBw.
Political groupings such as the Syria Left Coalition have released similar position statements.
Even the best commentators (eg. Anand Gopal: http://www.harpers.org/archive/2012/08/hbc-90008769) have referred to a rising sectarianism but I have yet to hear anything but the shallowest or most infrequent sectarian rhetoric often emanating from people outside Syria who are not being educated and disciplined by the revolutionary process. Many of these sources of anti-Shi’ah sectarian rhetoric are aligned with the Saudi or Gulf dictators for whom this sectarianism is crucial domestically, particularly in justifying the bloody repression of Bahrain’s pro-democracy movement. On the other hand we have seen a constant stream of anti-sectarian slogans and chants at demonstrations (“Wahid, wahid, wahid; al-sha’ab al-Suria wahid” – transl. One, one, one; the people of Syria are one!) and statements which have been endorsed by the democratic institutions such as the LCCs and revolutionary military organizations which together form the core of the Syrian revolution. I actually think it is remarkable that the Syrian revolution has been able to resist this trend and embrace anti-regime Alawites even when the regime is so blatantly sectarian and tries to play on these divisions. For example it has a majority Alawi officer corps and Alawi militia employed to commit massacres against the Sunna and use explicitly religious insults. The regime’s sectarianism has no equivalent on the revolutionary side. For the moment the democratic nature of the revolution, responding to a need for unity across communities in confronting Assad and his supporters, seems to have overcome regime provocations toward sectarianism. Given the success with which imperialism has fostered sectarian division to its advantage, most recently with the bloody US occupation in Iraq, this is yet another reason to oppose foreign intervention whilst at the same time calling for the victory of the heroic Syrian Revolution.
Syrian Revolution LCC Military Code of Conduct
Here I reproduce a statement posted on the Local Coordinating Committees facebook page on 8 Aug 2012.
New Battalions Sign the Code of Conduct
New Battalions Sign the Code of Conduct
As the ranks of the Free Syrian Army expand and its brave fighters fight a national, multi-front battle, there has become a need for rules to govern their work. These rules must combine the spirit of the national duty they carry out today in facing the aggressor, Bashar Al-Assad and his regime, and moving towards the regime’s ouster and the interests of justice and military discipline.
The Local Coordination Committees presents this brief code of conduct to the fighters and to the public, so as to draw attention to and highlight the moral and political ethics of military action. These ethics are, in essence, the same as positions the Free Syrian Army has taken in recent days, as well as the principles they have announced. These ethics and principles represent the essence of our revolution and its moral and national foundation.
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The Syrian Revolution erupted in Mid-March 2011 against a corrupt and despotic regime that weakened a country and humiliated its people, raising a small group of elites above the Syrian general public. From the very beginning, the regime responded to popular protests with violence and hatred, and pitted the national army against the revolutionary citizens to protect the oppressive regime.
The Free Syrian Army was formed by honorable officers, junior officers, and soldiers who defected from the regime because they refused to kill their fellow citizens. They were joined by brave civilians whose families and homes were destroyed by Assad’s aggression.
Today, the Free Syrian Army plays a genuine military role in the glorious Syrian revolution. Therefore, the values and goals of the revolution (freedom, dignity, and justice for Syria and the Syrian people, and the protection and unity of the country), must serve as the military doctrine and governing principles for the Army’s actions and the behavior of its members.
The Free Syrian Army looks forward to the day when Syria will be free, so that it might be at the core of a new national army that protects the country’s independence, sovereignty, constitution, and democratic institutions. The Free Syrian Army is sacrificing its blood in order for that day to come.
Article I
In the Free Syrian Army, as an independent, defected soldier, or civilian volunteer, my first responsibilities are to:
Defend Syrian revolutionaries in the face of tyranny and ensure the continuation of the revolution to oust the regime. I will direct my weapons exclusively against Assad aggressors. I will serve my nation, Syria, and the freedom of the Syrian people. I am a fighter in the battle to defend my people.
I will use my weapons to overthrow the criminal regime that has been imposed upon us.
Article II
I pledge to my people and my revolution that I will refrain from any behavior or practice that would undermine the principles of our revolution: the principles of freedom, citizenship, and dignity. I will respect human rights in accordance with our legal principles, our tolerant religious principles, and the international laws governing human rights – the very human rights for which we struggle today and which we intend to implement in the future Syria.
Article III
Any person who takes up arms in the name of the regime, regardless of their rank, should be arrested and remain in the custody of the Free Syrian Army. In the event that an individual is arrested, and it is determined that the individual was working for the regime, voluntarily or for payment, to supply information about revolutionary activists, that individual shall be considered a prisoner and treated in accordance with laws governing prisoners of war.
Article IV
I pledge not to practice any form of torture, rape, mutilation, or degradation. I will preserve prisoners’ rights and will not exercise any of the above practices in order to obtain confessions.
Article V
I will not issue any executive orders, particularly with regard to death or corporal punishment. Only an appropriate legal authority, with relevant expertise, may conduct trials and find perpetrators guilty.
Article VI
I will not engage in any practice that leads to the physical torture or murder of prisoners or informants, and I will not participate in any public execution.
Article VII
I pledge not to engage in any form of theft or looting on the pretext that I am helping to finance the armed struggle. I pledge not to take any person hostage for ransom.
Article VIII
I pledge not to use my weapon against activists or civilians, whether or not I agree with them; and I pledge to not use my weapon against any other Syrian citizen. I pledge to limit my use of weapons to the defense of our people and myself in facing the criminal regime.
Article IX
I pledge not to exercise reprisals on the basis of ethnicity, sect, religion, or any other basis, and to refrain from any abusive practices, in word or in deed, against any component of the Syrian people.
Article X
I pledge to surrender my weapons to the Transitional Authority, which will manage the country’s affairs during the transitional period after the fall of the regime.
Article XI
If found guilty of violating any of these articles, I agree to submit to a fair trial undertaken by specialized committees formed under the supervision of the Free Syrian Army’s leadership and monitored by an independent judiciary body.
Initial Signatories:
Lieutenant Colonel Muhannad Ahmad Al-Talaa, Commander of the Military Council of Deir Ezzor
Colonel Qassim Saad Eddin, Commander of the Military Council in Homs
Sergeant Ismail Sheikh Saleh, Jisr Al-Shoghour, Idlib
Lieutenant Colonel Zahid Hourani, head of the Military Office in Homs
Major Ibrahim Moutawaa, Commander of the Al-Nour Battalion in Qosair
Colonel Radwan Ayyoush, Commander of the Military Office in Homs
Lieutenant Colonel Jamil Ra’adoun, Commander of the League of Battalions in the Hama Countryside
Colonel Khaled Alqatini of Khan Sheihoun and its countryside
First Lieutenant Hamza Qaziz, Al-Baraa Brigade in Douma
The Al-Baraa Brigade in Douma
Major Abou Mohammad Al-Homsi, the Soldiers of God Brigade in Damascus
The Falcons of the Land Brigade in Hama
The Martyrs of Latamna Battalion
The Martyrs of Asi Battalion in Hama
The Abi Al-Fidaa Battalion in Hama
The Special Operations Battalion in Hama
The Sunna Lions Battalion in Mayadeen
The Omar Al-Mukhtar Battalion in Deir Baalba, Homs
Abdul Baset Sarout
New Signatures
Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad al-Aboud Commander of the Revolutionary Military Council in Deir Ezzor
Captain Mostafa Shawardi/ Ansar Mohammad Battalion in Mawrak
Lieutenant Colonel Hafez Jad AlKaeem Faraj Commander of the Military Council in the Governorate of Sweida
Lieutenant Maher al-Tamer Commander of Shuhada al-Hurriya (Martyrs of Freedom) Battalion in Mawrak
Al-Haq (The Truth) Battalion in Mqeilbiya
Burkan al-Sham (Damascus Volcano) Battalion
New Signatures
Major Qassem Najem/ Tahrir alJanoob Battalion in Daraa
Captain Khaled Fatehallah Commander of the Free Syrian Army in Daeel
Captain Ali Shakerdi/ al-Amjad Battalion in Aleppo
(source: http://www.facebook.com/notes/%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7/new-battalions-sign-the-code-of-conduct/508232342537240, accessed 20 Aug 2012)
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